<図書>
The non-reality of free will
責任表示 | Richard Double |
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データ種別 | 図書 |
出版情報 | New York : Oxford University Press , 1991 |
本文言語 | 英語 |
大きさ | xi, 247 p. ; 22 cm |
概要 | The traditional disputants in the free will discussion--the libertarian, soft determinist, and hard determinist--agree that free will is a coherent concept, while disagreeing on how the concept might...be satisfied and whether it can, in fact, be satisfied. In this innovative analysis, Richard Double offers a bold new argument, rejecting all of the traditional theories and proposing that the concept of free will cannot be satisfied, no matter what the nature of reality. Arguing that there is unavoidable conflict within our understanding of moral responsibility and free choice, Double seeks to prove that when we ascribe responsibility, blame, or freedom, we merely express attitudes, rather than state anything capable of truth or falsity. Free will, he concludes, is essentially an incoherent notion. 続きを見る |
所蔵情報
状態 | 巻次 | 所蔵場所 | 請求記号 | 刷年 | 文庫名称 | 資料番号 | コメント | 予約・取寄 | 複写申込 | 自動書庫 |
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中央図 4C_1‐135 [法] | B 20/D/44 | 1991 |
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068152191001504 |
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書誌詳細
一般注記 | Includes index Bibliography: p. 235-241 |
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著者標目 | *Double, Richard |
件 名 | LCSH:Free will and determinism |
分 類 | LCC:BJ1461 DC20:123/.5 |
書誌ID | 1000111362 |
ISBN | 0195064976 |
NCID | BA11506581 |
巻冊次 | ISBN:0195064976 |
登録日 | 2009.09.10 |
更新日 | 2009.09.10 |